KOSEN 한인과학기술자네트워크

Several implications of the changes to the control thresholds and the proposed change in U.S. computer export control policy related to increased risks for U.S. national security. ◆ The inadequacies of the President's justifications again demonstrate the need for a comprehensive study of the issues involved. ◆ The new rules effectively eliminate routine prior U.S. government review of computer exports below the licensing threshold to sensitive countries. In the past, we found that establishing a notification threshold lower than the licensing threshold was useful in that it allowed the U.S government to deny or defer some exports, or make other exports conditional upon additional safeguards. ◆ Raising licensing control thresholds in January 2001 increases the risk that more powerful computers might be exported without a license to sensitive customers nearly a year before Defense projects that these customers could attain the same computing power by clustering less powerful computers ◆ Defense and Commerce officials said that the U.S. government will have to rely more heavily on computer vendors to “know your customers“ and assess their intentions to use computers for proliferation purposes. Past evidence has shown this reliance may be misplaced. ◆ The policy proposal would reduce information that might be useful in detecting patterns of exports to customers engaged in proliferation activities because it would eliminate an annual reporting requirement that provides information on end users.