KOSEN 한인과학기술자네트워크

Over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. For example, in 1998 and again in 1999, NRC identified several communication weaknesses, including delays in activating the pagers used to alert the utility's staff about an emergency. Consolidated Edison had some actions under way to correct emergency preparedness weaknesses before the February 2000 event and initiated others to address the problems that occurred during it. However, according to an April 2001 NRC inspection report, the actions had not been fully effective. With respect to the aforementioned communications weaknesses in particular, in evaluating Consolidated Edison's response to the February 2000 emergency, NRC found that critical personnel were not notfied in a timely fashion, which delayed the critical personnel were not notified in a timely fashion, which delayed the staffing and operation of the on-site emergency response facility. NRC found that this occurred because the process to activate the pagers was complex and not well understood and that Consolidated Edison had acted without diagnosing the underlying causes of the problems. As a result, NRC found emergency preparedness problems similar to those it had identified before and during the February 2000 event. Despite the weaknesses identifited, in commenting on a fraft of this report, NRC noted that Consolidated Edison's emergency preparedness program could protect the public. The four counties in New York State that are responsible for responding to a radiological emergency at Indian Point 2 have strengthened their emergency preparedness programs as a result of the lessons learned from the February 2000 event. These lessons included the need for better coordination between the counties in responding to a radiological emergency and in providing the media with information. An other important lesson learned was the need to improve communication during an emergency between Consolidated Edison and the counties about the extent of the problems and their potential impact on the public. This lesson resulted in one important change to improve communications among the state, counties, and Consolidated Edison. In partnership. they revised the form that Consolidated Edison used to provide information on whether radiation was released from the plant. Although the February 2000 event posed no danger to the public, Consolidated Edison had not clearly communicated with the state and counties about whether a radioactive release had occurred and its magnitude. Consolidated Edison reported that a radioactive release had occurred. This contradictory information led to credibility problems with the media and the public. The form now clearly shows whether a release has occurred.